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Abstract
While social media offer great communication opportunities, they also increase the vulnera-
bility of young people to threatening situations online. Recent studies report that cyberbully-
ing constitutes a growing problem among youngsters. Successful prevention depends on
the adequate detection of potentially harmful messages and the information overload on the
Web requires intelligent systems to identify potential risks automatically. The focus of this
paper is on automatic cyberbullying detection in social media text by modelling posts written
by bullies, victims, and bystanders of online bullying. We describe the collection and fine-
grained annotation of a cyberbullying corpus for English and Dutch and perform a series of
binary classification experiments to determine the feasibility of automatic cyberbullying
detection. We make use of linear support vector machines exploiting a rich feature set and
investigate which information sources contribute the most for the task. Experiments on a
hold-out test set reveal promising results for the detection of cyberbullying-related posts.
After optimisation of the hyperparameters, the classifier yields an F1 score of 64% and 61%
for English and Dutch respectively, and considerably outperforms baseline systems.
Introduction
Web 2.0 has had a substantial impact on communication and relationships in today’s society.
Children and teenagers go online more frequently, at younger ages, and in more diverse ways
(e.g. smartphones, laptops and tablets). Although most of teenagers’ Internet use is harmless
and the benefits of digital communication are evident, the freedom and anonymity experi-
enced online makes young people vulnerable with cyberbullying being one of the major threats
[1, 2].
Bullying is not a new phenomenon and cyberbullying has manifested itself as soon as digital
technologies have become primary communication tools. On the positive side, social media
like blogs, social networking sites (e.g. Facebook), and instant messaging platforms (e.g. What-
sApp) make it possible to communicate with anyone and at any time. Moreover, they are a
place where people engage in social interaction, offering the possibility to establish new
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relationships and maintain existing friendships [3, 4]. On the negative side however, social
media increase the risk of children being confronted with threatening situations including
grooming or sexually transgressive behaviour, signals of depression and suicidal thoughts, and
cyberbullying. Users are reachable 24/7 and are often able to remain anonymous if desired:
this makes social media a convenient way for bullies to target their victims outside the school
yard.
With regard to cyberbullying, a number of national and international initiatives have been
launched over the past few years to increase children’s online safety. Examples include KiVa
(http://www.kivaprogram.net/), a Finnish cyberbullying prevention programme, the ‘Non au
harcèlement’ campaign in France, Belgian governmental initiatives and helplines (e.g. clicksafe.
be, veiligonline.be, mediawijs.be) that provide information about online safety, and so on.
In spite of these efforts, a lot of undesirable and hurtful content remains online. [2] analysed
a body of quantitative research on cyberbullying and observed cybervictimisation rates among
teenagers between 20% and 40%. [5] focused on 12 to 17 year olds living in the United States
and found that no less than 72% of them had encountered cyberbullying at least once within
the year preceding the questionnaire. [6] surveyed 9 to 26 year olds in the United States, Can-
ada, the United Kingdom and Australia, and found that 29% of the respondents had ever been
victimised online. A study among 2,000 Flemish secondary school students (age 12 to 18)
revealed that 11% of them had been bullied online at least once in the six months preceding
the survey [7]. Finally, the 2014 large-scale EU Kids Online Report [8] published that 20% of
11 to 16 year olds had been exposed to hate messages online. In addition, youngsters were 12%
more likely to be exposed to cyberbullying as compared to 2010, which clearly demonstrates
that cyberbullying is a growing problem.
The prevalence of cybervictimisation depends on the conceptualisation used in describing
cyberbullying, but also on research variables such as location and the number and age span of
the participants. Nevertheless, the above studies demonstrate that online platforms are increas-
ingly used for bullying, which is a cause for concern given its impact. As shown by [9–11],
cyberbullying may negatively impact the victim’s self-esteem, academic achievement and emo-
tional well-being. [12] found that self-reported effects of cyberbullying include negative effects
on school grades and feelings of sadness, anger, fear, and depression. In extreme cases, cyber-
bullying could even lead to self-harm and suicidal thoughts.
These findings demonstrate that cyberbullying is a serious problem the consequences of
which can be dramatic. Early detection of cyberbullying attempts is therefore of key impor-
tance to youngsters’ mental well-being. Successful detection depends on effective monitoring
of online content, but the amount of information on the Web makes it practically unfeasible
for moderators to monitor all user-generated content manually. To tackle this problem, intelli-
gent systems are required that process this information in a fast way and automatically signal
potential threats. This way, moderators can respond quickly and prevent threatening situations
from escalating. According to recent research, teenagers are generally in favour of such auto-
matic monitoring, provided that effective follow-up strategies are formulated, and that privacy
and autonomy are guaranteed [13].
Parental control tools (e.g. NetNanny, https://www.netnanny.com/) already block unsuited
or undesirable content and some social networks make use of keyword-based moderation
tools (i.e. using lists of profane and insulting words to flag harmful content). However, such
approaches typically fail to detect implicit and subtle forms of cyberbullying in which no
explicit vocabulary is used. This creates the need for intelligent and self-learning systems that
go beyond keyword spotting and hence improve the recall of cyberbullying detection.
The ultimate goal of this type of research is to develop models that could improve manual
monitoring for cyberbullying on social networks. We explore the automatic detection of
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textual signals of cyberbullying, in which cyberbulying is approached as a complex phenome-
non that can be realised in various ways (see the Annotation guidelines section for a detailed
overview). While the vast majority of the related research focuses on detecting cyberbullying
‘attacks’ (i.e. verbal aggression), the present study takes different types of cyberbullying into
account, including more implicit posts from the bully, but also posts written by victims and
bystanders. This is a more inclusive conceptualisation for the task of cyberbullying detection
and should aid in moderation and prevention efforts by capturing different and more implicit
signals of bullying.
To tackle this problem, we propose a machine learning method based on a linear SVM
classifier [14, 15] exploiting a rich feature set. The contribution we make is twofold: first, we
develop a complex classifier to detect signals of cyberbullying, which allows us to detect differ-
ent types of cyberbullying that are related to different social roles involved in a cyberbullying
event. Second, we demonstrate that the methodology is easily portable to other languages, pro-
vided there is annotated data available, by performing experiments on an English and Dutch
dataset.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section presents a definition
of cyberbullying and its participant roles and provides an overview of the state of the art in
cyberbullying detection. The Data collection and annotation section describes the corpus con-
struction and annotation. Next, we present the experimental setup and discuss our experimen-
tal results for English and Dutch. Finally, the Conclusion and future research section concludes
this paper and provides some perspectives for further research.
Related research
Both offline and online bullying are widely covered in the realm of social sciences and psychol-
ogy, and the increasing number of cyberbullying cases in recent years [16] has stimulated
research efforts to detect cyberbullying automatically. In the following section, we present a
definition of cyberbullying and identify its participant roles and we provide a brief overview of
automatic approaches to cyberbullying detection.
Cyberbullying definition and participant roles
A common starting point for conceptualising cyberbullying are definitions of traditional (i.e.
offline) bullying, one of the most influential ones being formulated by [17]. The researcher
described bullying based on three main criteria, including i) intention (i.e. a bully intends to
inflict harm on the victim), ii) repetition (i.e. bullying acts take place repeatedly over time)
and iii) a power imbalance between the bully and the victim (i.e. a more powerful bully attacks
a less powerful victim). With respect to cyberbullying, a number of definitions are based on
the above criteria. A popular definition is that of [18, p. 376], which describes cyberbullying as
“an aggressive, intentional act carried out by a group or individual, using electronic forms of
contact, repeatedly and over time, against a victim who cannot easily defend him or herself”.
However, opinion on the applicability of the above characteristics to cyberbullying is very
much divided [19], and besides theoretical objections, a number of practical limitations have
been observed. Firstly, while [17] claims intention to be inherent to traditional bullying, this is
much harder to ascertain in an online environment. Online conversations lack the signals of a
face-to-face interaction like intonation, facial expressions and gestures, which makes them
more ambiguous than real-life conversations. The receiver may therefore get the wrong
impression that they are being offended or ridiculed [20]. Another criterion for bullying that
might not hold in online situations is the power imbalance between the bully and the victim.
This can be evident in real life (e.g. the bully is taller, stronger or older than the victim), but it
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is hard to conceptualise or measure online, where power may be related to technological skills,
anonymity or the inability of the victim to escape from the bullying [19, 21]. Also empowering
for the bully are inherent characteristics of the Web: once defamatory or confidential informa-
tion is made public through the Internet, it is hard to remove.
Finally, while arguing that repetition distinguishes bullying from single acts of aggression,
[17] himself states that such a single aggressive action can be considered bullying under certain
circumstances. Accordingly, [21] claim that repetition in cyberbullying is problematic to oper-
ationalise, as it is unclear what the consequences are of a single derogatory message on a public
page. A single act of aggression or humiliation may cause continued distress and humiliation
for the victim if it is shared or liked by a large audience [21]. [22, p. 26] compare this with the
“snowball effect”: one post may be repeated or distributed by other people so that it becomes
out of the control of the initial bully and has larger effects than was originally intended.
Given these arguments, a number of less ‘strict’ definitions of cyberbullying were proposed
by among others [2, 5, 6], where a power imbalance and repetition are not deemed necessary
conditions for cyberbullying.
The above paragraphs demonstrate that defining cyberbullying is far from trivial, and vary-
ing prevalence rates (see the Introduction section) confirm that a univocal definition of the
phenomenon is still lacking in the literature [2]. Based on existing conceptualisations, we
define cyberbullying as content that is published online by an individual and that is aggressive or
hurtful against a victim. Based on this definition, an annotation scheme was developed [23] to
signal textual characteristics of cyberbullying, including posts from bullies, as well as reactions
from victims and bystanders.
Cyberbullying research also involves the identification of its participant roles. [24] were
among the first to define the roles in a bullying situation. Based on surveys among teenagers
involved in real-life bullying situations, they defined six participant roles: victims (i.e. who are
the target of repeated harassment), bullies (i.e. who are the initiative-taking perpetrators),
assistants of the bully (i.e. who encourage the bullying), reinforcers of the bully (i.e. who rein-
force the bullying), defenders (i.e. who comfort the victim, take their side or try to stop the bul-
lying) and outsiders (i.e. who ignore or distance themselves from the situation). In sum, in
addition to the bully and victim, the researchers distinguish four bystanders (i.e. assistants,
reinforcers, defenders and outsiders). [25], however, do not distinguish between reinforcers
and assistants of the bullying. Their typology includes victims, bullies and three types of
bystanders: i) bystanders who participate in the bullying, ii) bystanders who help or support
the victim and iii) bystanders who ignore the bullying. The cyberbullying roles that are identi-
fied in our annotation scheme are based on existing bullying role typologies, given that tradi-
tional bullying roles are applicable to cyberbullying as well [26, 27]. More details about the
different roles that we take into account are provided in the Data collection and annotation
section.
Bystanders and -to a lesser extent- victims are often overlooked in the related research. As a
result, these studies can be better characterised as verbal aggression detection concerned with
retrieving bully attacks. By taking bystanders into account, we capture different and more sub-
tle signals of a bullying episode. Note that while in this work we did not include classification
of the participant roles as such, they are essential to the conceptualisation of the current detec-
tion task.
Detecting and preventing cyberbullying
As mentioned earlier, although research on cyberbullying detection is more limited than social
studies on the phenomenon, some important advances have been made in recent years. In
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what follows, we present a brief overview of the most important natural language processing
approaches to cyberbullying detection, but we refer to the survey paper by [28] for a more
detailed overview.
Although some studies have investigated the effectiveness of rule-based modelling [29], the
dominant approach to cyberbullying detection involves machine learning. Most machine
learning approaches are based on supervised [30, 30–32] or semi-supervised learning [33]. The
former involves the construction of a classifier based on labelled training data, whereas semi-
supervised approaches rely on classifiers that are built from a training corpus containing a
small set of labelled and a large set of unlabelled instances. Semi-supervised methods are often
used to handle data sparsity, a typical issue in cyberbullying research. As cyberbullying detec-
tion essentially involves the distinction between bullying and non-bullying posts, the problem
is generally approached as a binary classification task where the positive class is represented
by instances containing (textual) cyberbullying, while the negative class is devoid of bullying
signals.
A key challenge in cyberbullying research is the availability of suitable data, which is neces-
sary to develop models that characterise cyberbullying. In recent years, only a few datasets
have become publicly available for this particular task, such as the training sets provided in
the context of the CAW 2.0 workshop (http://caw2.barcelonamedia.org), a MySpace (https://
myspace.com) [34] and Formspring (http://www.formspring.me) cyberbullying corpus anno-
tated with the help of Mechanical Turk [29], and more recently, the Twitter Bullying Traces
dataset [35]. Many studies have therefore constructed their own corpus from social media
websites that are prone to bullying content, such as YouTube [30, 32], Twitter [36, 37], Insta-
gram [38], MySpace [31, 34], FormSpring [29, 39], Kaggle [40] and ASKfm [41]. Despite the
bottleneck of data availability, cyberbullying detection approaches have been successfully
implemented over the past years and the relevance of automatic text analysis techniques to
ensure child safety online has been recognised [42].
Among the first studies on cyberbullying detection are [29–31], who explored the predic-
tive power of n-grams (with and without tf-idf weighting), part-of-speech information (e.g.
first and second pronouns), and sentiment information based on (polarity and profanity)
lexicons for this task. Similar features were not only exploited for coarse-grained cyberbully-
ing detection, but also for the detection of more fine-grained cyberbullying categories [41].
Despite their apparent simplicity, content-based features (i.e. lexical, syntactic and sentiment
information) are very often exploited in recent approaches to cyberbullying detection [33,
43]. In fact, as observed by [28], more than 41 papers have approached cyberbullying detec-
tion using content-based features, which confirms that this type of information is crucial for
the task.
More and more, however, content-based features are combined with semantic features
derived from topic model information [44], word embeddings and representation learning
[43, 45]. More recent studies have also demonstrated the added value of user-based informa-
tion for the task, more specifically by including users’ activities (i.e. the number of posts) on a
social network, their age, gender, location, number of friends and followers, and so on [32, 33,
46, 47]. A final feature type that gains increasing popularity in cyberbullying detection are net-
work-based features, whose application is motivated by the frequent use of social media data
for the task. By using network information, researchers aim to capture social relations between
participants in a conversation (e.g. bully versus victim), and other relevant information such as
the popularity of a person (i.e. which can indicate the power of a potential bully) on a social
network, the number of (historical) interactions between two people, and so on. [48] for
instance used network-based features to take the behavioural history of a potential bully into
account. [49] detected cyberbullying in tweets and included network features inspired by
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Olweus’ [17] bullying conditions (see supra). More specifically, they measured the power
imbalance between a bully and victim, as well as the bully’s popularity based on interaction
graphs and the bully’s position in the network.
As mentioned earlier, social media are a commonly used genre for this type of tasks. More
recently, researchers have investigated cyberbullying detection in multi-modal data offered by
specific platforms. For instance [38] explored cyberbullying detection using multi-modal data
extracted from the social network Instagram. More precisely, they combined textual features
derived from the posts themselves with user metadata and image features and showed that
integrating the latter enhanced the classification performance. [37] also detected cyberbullying
in different data genres, including ASKfm, Twitter, and Instagram. They took role information
into account by integrating bully and victim scores as features, based on the occurrence of
bully-related keywords in their sent or received posts.
With respect to the datasets used in cyberbullying research, it can be observed that corpora
are often composed by keyword search (e.g. [43, 44]), which produces a biased dataset of posi-
tive (i.e. bullying) instances. To balance these corpora, negative data are often added from a
background corpus or data resampling [50] techniques are adopted [33, 47]. For this research,
data were randomly crawled across ASKfm and no keyword search was used to collect bullying
data. Instead, all instances were manually annotated for the presence of bullying. As a result,
our corpus contains a realistic distribution of bullying instances.
When looking at the performance of automatic cyberbullying, we see that scores vary
greatly and do not only depend on the implemented algorithm and parameter settings, but
also on a number of other variables. These include the metrics that are used to evaluate the sys-
tem (i.e. micro- or macro-averaged F1, precision, recall, AUC, etc.), the corpus genre (i.e. Face-
book, Twitter, ASKfm, Instagram) and class distribution (i.e. balanced or unbalanced), the
annotation method (i.e. automatic annotations or manual annotations using crowdsourcing
or by experts) and, perhaps the most important distinguishing factor, the conceptualisation of
cyberbullying that is used. More concretely, while some approaches identify sensitive topics
[30] or insulting language [29], others propose a more comprehensive approach by capturing
different types of cyberbullying [41] or by modelling the bully-victim communications
involved in a cyberbullying incident [37].
The studies discussed in this section demonstrated the variety of approaches that have been
used to tackle cyberbullying detection. However, most of them focused on cyberbullying
‘attacks’, or posts written by a bully. Moreover, it is not entirely clear if different forms of
cyberbullying were taken into account (e.g. sexual intimidation or harassment, or psychologi-
cal threats), in addition to derogatory language or insults. In the present study, cyberbullying
is considered a complex phenomenon comprising different forms of harmful online behav-
iour, which are described in more detail in our annotation scheme [23]. Purposing to facilitate
manual monitoring efforts on social networks, we developed a system that automatically
detects signals of cyberbullying, including attacks from bullies, as well as victim and bystander
reactions, the latter of which are generally overlooked in related research.
Most similar to this research is the work by [44], [43, 45], who investigated bullying traces
posted by different author roles (e.g. bully, victim, bystander, assistant, defender, reporter,
accuser, reinforcer). However, they collected tweets using the keywords bully, bullied and bully-
ing. As a result, their corpus contained many reports or testimonials of cyberbullying (example
1), instead of actual cyberbullying. Moreover, their method implies that cyberbullying signals
that are devoid of such keywords are not included in the training corpus.
1. “Some tweens got violent on the n train, the one boy got off after blows 2 the chest. . . Saw
him cryin as he walkd away: (bullying not cool” [44, p. 658]
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What clearly distinguishes these works from the present is that their conceptualisation of
cyberbullying is not explained. It is, in other words, not clear which type of posts are consid-
ered bullying and which are not. In the present research, we identify different types of bullying
and all are included in the positive class of our experimental corpus.
For this research, English and Dutch social media data were annotated for fine-grained
forms of cyberbullying, based on the actors involved in a cyberbullying incident. After prelimi-
nary experiments for Dutch [41, 51], we currently present an optimised cyberbullying detec-
tion method for English and Dutch and hereby show that the proposed methodology can
easily be applied to different languages, provided that annotated data are available.
Data collection and annotation
To be able to build representative models for cyberbullying, a suitable dataset is required. This
section describes the construction of two corpora, English and Dutch, containing social media
posts that are manually annotated for cyberbullying according to our fine-grained annotation
scheme. This allows us to cover different forms and participants (or roles) involved in a cyber-
bullying event.
Data collection
Two corpora were constructed by collecting data from the social networking site ASKfm,
where users can create profiles and ask or answer questions, with the option of doing so anon-
ymously. ASKfm data typically consists of question-answer pairs published on a user’s profile.
The data were retrieved by crawling a number of seed profiles using the GNU Wget software
(http://www.gnu.org/software/wget/) in April and October, 2013. After language filtering
(i.e. non-English or non-Dutch content was removed), the experimental corpora comprised
113,698 and 78,387 posts for English and Dutch, respectively.
Data annotation
Cyberbullying has been a widely covered research topic recently and studies have shed light on
direct and indirect types of cyberbullying, implicit and explicit forms, verbal and non-verbal
cyberbullying, and so on. This is important from a sociolinguistic point of view, but knowing
what cyberbullying involves is also crucial to build models for automatic cyberbullying detec-
tion. In the following paragraphs, we present our data annotation guidelines [23] and focus on
different types and roles related to the phenomenon.
Types of cyberbullying
Cyberbullying research is mainly centered around the conceptualisation, occurrence and pre-
vention of the phenomenon [1, 52, 53]. Sociolinguistic studies have identified different types
of cyberbullying [12, 54, 55] and compared these types with forms of traditional or offline
bullying [20]. Like traditional bullying, direct and indirect forms of cyberbullying have been
identified. Direct cyberbullying refers to actions in which the victim is directly involved (e.g.
sending a virus-infected file, excluding someone from an online group, insulting and threaten-
ing), whereas indirect cyberbullying can take place without awareness of the victim (e.g. outing
or publishing confidential information, spreading gossip, creating a hate page on social net-
working sites) [20].
The present annotation scheme describes some specific textual categories related to cyber-
bullying, including threats, insults, defensive statements from a victim, encouragements to the
harasser, etc. (see the Data collection and annotation section for a complete overview). All of
Automatic detection of cyberbullying in social media text
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203794 October 8, 2018 7 / 22
these forms were inspired by social studies on cyberbullying [7, 20] and manual inspection of
cyberbullying examples.
Roles in cyberbullying
Similarly to traditional bullying, cyberbullying involves a number of participants that adopt
well-defined roles. Researchers have identified several roles in (cyber)bullying interactions.
Although traditional studies on bullying have mainly concentrated on bullies and victims [24],
the importance of bystanders in a bullying episode has been acknowledged [56, 57]. Bystanders
can support the victim and mitigate the negative effects caused by the bullying [57], especially
on social networking sites, where they hold higher intentions to help the victim than in real life
conversations [58]. [25] distinguish three main types of bystanders: i) bystanders who partici-
pate in the bullying, ii) who help or support the victim and iii) those who ignore the bullying.
Given that passive bystanders are hard to recognise in online text, only the former two are
included in our annotation scheme.
Annotation guidelines
To operationalise the task of automatic cyberbullying detection, we elaborated a detailed anno-
tation scheme for cyberbullying that is strongly embedded in the literature and applied it to
our corpora. The applicability of the scheme was iteratively tested. Our final guidelines for the
fine-grained annotation of cyberbullying are described in a technical report [23]. The objective
of the scheme was to indicate several types of textual cyberbullying and verbal aggression, their
severity, and the author participant roles. The scheme is formulated to be generic and is not
limited to a specific social media platform. All messages were annotated in context (i.e. pre-
sented within their original content or conversation event) when available.
Essentially, the annotation scheme describes two levels of annotation. Firstly, the annotators
were asked to indicate, at the message or post level, whether the text under investigation was
related to cyberbullying. If the message was considered harmful and thus contained indica-
tions of cyberbullying, annotators identified the author’s participant role. Based on the litera-
ture on role-allocation in cyberbullying episodes [25, 59], four roles are distinguished in the
annotation scheme, including victim, bully, and two types of bystanders.
1. Harasser or bully: person who initiates the bullying.
2. Victim: person who is harassed.
3. Bystander-defender: person who helps the victim and discourages the harasser from con-
tinuing his actions.
4. Bystander-assistant: person who does not initiate, but helps or encourages the harasser.
Secondly, at the sub-sentence level, the annotators were tasked with the identification of
fine-grained text categories related to cyberbullying. In the literature, different forms of cyber-
bullying are identified [12, 54, 55] and compared with traditional bullying [20]. Based on these
forms, the annotation scheme describes a number of textual categories that are often inherent
to a cyberbullying event, such as threats, insults, defensive statements from a victim, encour-
agements to the harasser, etc. Most of the categories are related to direct forms of cyberbullying
(as defined by [25]), while one is related to outing [25], an indirect form of cyberbullying,
namely defamation. Additionally, a number of subcategories were defined to make the annota-
tion scheme as concrete and distinctive as possible (e.g., discrimination as a subcategory of
insult). All cyberbullying-related categories in the scheme are listed below, and an example
post for each category is presented in Table 1.
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• Threat/blackmail: expressions containing physical or psychological threats or indications of
blackmail.
• Insult: expressions meant to hurt or offend the victim.
• General insult: general expressions containing abusive, degrading or offensive language
that are meant to insult the addressee.
• Attacking relatives: insulting expressions towards relatives or friends of the victim.
• Discrimination: expressions of unjust or prejudicial treatment of the victim. Two types of
discrimination are distinguished (i.e. sexism and racism). Other forms of discrimination
should be categorised as general insults.
• Curse/exclusion: expressions of a wish that some form of adversity or misfortune will befall
the victim and expressions that exclude the victim from a conversation or a social group.
• Defamation: expressions that reveal confident or defamatory information about the victim
to a large public.
• Sexual Talk: expressions with a sexual meaning or connotation. A distinction is made
between innocent sexual talk and sexual harassment.
• Defense: expressions in support of the victim, expressed by the victim himself or by a
bystander.
• Bystander defense: expressions by which a bystander shows support for the victim or dis-
courages the harasser from continuing his actions.
• Victim defense: assertive or powerless reactions from the victim.
• Encouragement to the harasser: expressions in support of the harasser.
• Other: expressions that contain any other form of cyberbullying-related behaviour than the
ones described here.
It is important to note that the categories were always indicated in text, even if the post
in which they occurred was not considered harmful, for instance in the post “hi bitches, in
for a movie?”, “bitches” was annotated as an insult while the post itself was not considered
cyberbullying.




Threat/blackmail [I am going to find out who you are & I swear you are going to regret it.]THREAT
Insult [Kill yourself] CURS [you fucking mc slut!!!!]GEN. INSULT [NO ONE LIKES YOU!!!!!]GEN. INSULT [You
are an ugly useless little whore!!!!] GEN. INSULT
Curse/Exclusion [Fuck you.]GEN. INSULT [Now shush I don’t wanna hear anything.]CURSE OR EXCLUSION
Defamation [She slept with her ex behind his girlfiends back and she and him had broken up.] DEFAMATION
Sexual Talk [Naked pic of you now.]SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Defense [I would appreciate if you dindn’t talk shit about my bestfriend.]GEN. VICTIM DEFENSE He has enough
to deal with already.
Encour. to har. [She is a massive slut]GEN. INSULT [i agree with you @user she is!]ENCOUR. HARASSER [LOL AT HER
mate, im on your side]ENCOUR. HARASSER
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203794.t001
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To provide the annotators with some context, all posts were presented within their original
conversation when possible. All annotations were done using the brat rapid annotation tool
[60], some examples of which are presented in Table 1.
As can be deduced from the examples in the table, there were no restrictions as to what
form the annotations could take. They could be adjectives, noun phrases, verb phrases, and so
on. The only condition was that the annotation could not span more than one sentence and
less than one word. Posts that were (primarily) written in another language than the corpus
language (i.e. Dutch and English) were marked as such and required no further annotations.
We examined the validity of our guidelines and the annotations with an inter-annotator
agreement experiment that is described in the following section.
Annotation statistics
The English and Dutch corpora were independently annotated for cyberbullying by trained
linguists. All were Dutch native speakers and English second-language speakers. To demon-
strate the validity of our guidelines, inter-annotator agreement scores were calculated using
Kappa on a subset of each corpus. Inter-rater agreement for Dutch (2 raters) is calculated
using Cohen’s Kappa [61]. Fleiss’ Kappa [62] is used for the English corpus (> 2 raters). Kappa
scores for the identification of cyberbullying are κ = 0.69 (Dutch) and κ = 0.59 (English).
As shown in Table 2, inter-annotator agreement for the identification of the more fine-
grained categories for English varies from fair to substantial [63], except for defamation, which
appears to be more difficult to recognise. No encouragements to the harasser were present in
this subset of the corpus. For Dutch, the inter-annotator agreement is fair to substantial, except
for curse and defamation. Analysis revealed that one of both annotators often annotated the lat-
ter as an insult, and in some cases even did not consider it as cyberbullying-related.
In short, the inter-rater reliability study shows that the annotation of cyberbullying is not
trivial and that more fine-grained categories like defamation, curse and encouragements are
sometimes hard to recognise. It appears that defamations were sometimes hard to distinguish
from insults, whereas curses and exclusions were sometimes considered insults or threats.
The analysis further reveals that encouragements to the harasser are subject to interpretation.
Some are straightforward (e.g. “I agree we should send her hate”), whereas others are subject
to the annotator’s judgment and interpretation (e.g. “hahaha”, “LOL”).
Experimental setup
In this paper, we explore the feasibility of automatically recognising signals of cyberbullying. A
crucial difference with related research is that we do not only model bully ‘attacks’, but also
more implicit forms of cyberbullying and reactions from victims and bystanders (i.e. all under
one binary label ‘signals of cyberbullying’), since these could likewise indicate that cyberbully-
ing is going on. The experiments described in this paper focus on the automatic detection of
such cyberbullying signals that need to be further investigated by human moderators when
applied in a real-life moderation loop.
The English and Dutch corpus contain 113,698 and 78,387 posts, respectively. As shown in
Table 3, the experimental corpus features a heavily imbalanced class distribution with the
Table 2. Inter-annotator agreement on the fine-grained categories related to cyberbullying.
Threat Insult Defense Sexual talk Curse/exclusion Defamation Encouragements to the harasser
English 0.65 0.63 0.45 0.38 0.58 0.15 N/A
Dutch 0.52 0.66 0.63 0.53 0.19 0.00 0.21
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203794.t002
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large majority of posts not being part of cyberbullying. In classification, this class imbalance
can lead to decreased performance. We apply cost-sensitive SVM as a possible hyperparameter
in optimisation to counter this. The cost-sensitive SVM reweighs the penalty parameter C of
the error term by the inverse class-ratio. This means that misclassifications of the minority
positive class are penalised more than classification errors on the majority negative class.
Other pre-processing methods to handle data imbalance in classification include feature filter-
ing metrics and data resampling [64]. These methods were omitted as they were found to be
too computationally expensive given our high-dimensional dataset.
For the automatic detection of cyberbullying, we performed binary classification experi-
ments using a linear kernel support vector machine (SVM) implemented in LIBLINEAR [65]
by making use of Scikit-learn [66], a machine learning library for Python. The motivation
behind this is twofold: i) support vector machines (SVMs) have proven to work well for tasks
similar to the ones under investigation [67] and ii) LIBLINEAR allows fast training of large-
scale data which allow for a linear mapping (which was confirmed after a series of preliminary
experiments using LIBSVM with linear, RBF and polynomial kernels).
The classifier was optimised for feature type (see the Pre-processing and feature engineering
section) and hyperparameter combinations (see Table 4). Model selection was done using
10-fold cross validation in grid search over all possible feature types (i.e. groups of similar fea-
tures, like different orders of n-gram bag-of-words features) and hyperparameter configura-
tions. The best performing hyperparameters are selected by F1 score on the positive class. The
winning model is then retrained on all held-in data and subsequently tested on a hold-out test
set to assess whether the classifier is over- or under-fitting. The hold-out set represents a ran-
dom sample (10%) of all data. The folds were randomly stratified splits over the hold-in class
distribution. Testing all feature type combinations is a rudimentary form of feature selection
and provides insight into which types of features work best for this particular task.
Feature selection over all individual features was not performed because of the large feature
space (NL: 795,072 and EN: 871,296 individual features). [68], among other researchers, dem-
onstrated the importance of joint optimisation, where feature selection and hyperparameter
optimisation are performed simultaneously, since the techniques mutually influence each
other.
The optimised models are evaluated against two baseline systems: i) an unoptimised lin-
ear-kernel SVM (configured with default parameter settings) based on word n-grams only
and, ii) a keyword-based system that marks posts as positive for cyberbullying if they contain a
word from existing vocabulary lists composed by aggressive language and profanity terms.
Table 3. Statistics of the English and Dutch cyberbullying corpus.




Table 4. Hyperparameters in grid-search model selection.
Hyperparameter Values
Penalty of error term C 1e{−3, −2, . . ., 2,3}
Loss function Hinge, squared hinge
Penalty: norm used in penalisation ‘l1’ (‘least absolute deviations’) or ‘l2’ (‘least squares’)
Class weight (sets penalty C of class i to
weightC)
None or ‘balanced’, i.e. weight inversely proportional to class
frequencies
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203794.t004
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Pre-processing and feature engineering
As pre-processing, we applied tokenisation, PoS-tagging and lemmatisation to the data using
the LeTs Preprocess Toolkit [69]. In supervised learning, a machine learning algorithm takes a
set of training instances (of which the label is known) and seeks to build a model that generates
a desired prediction for an unseen instance. To enable the model construction, all instances
are represented as a vector of features (i.e. inherent characteristics of the data) that contain
information that is potentially useful to distinguish cyberbullying from non-cyberbullying
content.
We experimentally tested whether cyberbullying events can be recognised automatically by
lexical markers in a post. To this end, all posts were represented by a number of information
sources (or features) including lexical features like bags-of-words, sentiment lexicon features
and topic model features, which are described in more detail below. Prior to feature extraction,
some data cleaning steps were executed, such as the replacement of hyperlinks and @-replies,
removal of superfluous white spaces, and the replacement of abbreviations by their full form
(based on an existing mapping dictionary: http://www.chatslang.com/terms/abbreviations/).
Additionally, tokenisation was applied before n-gram extraction and sentiment lexicon match-
ing, and stemming was applied prior to extracting topic model features.
After pre-processing of the corpus, the following feature types were extracted:
• Word n-gram bag-of-words: binary features indicating the presence of word unigrams,
bigrams and trigrams.
• Character n-gram bag-of-words: binary features indicating the presence of character
bigrams, trigrams and fourgrams (without crossing word boundaries). Character n-grams
provide some abstraction from the word level and provide robustness to the spelling varia-
tion that characterises social media data.
• Term lists: one binary feature derived for each one out of six lists, indicating the presence of
an item from the list in a post:
• proper names: a gazetteer of named entities collected from several resources (e.g. Wikipedia).
• ‘allness’ indicators (e.g. “always”, “everybody”): forms which indicate rhetorical superlativ-
ity [70] which can be helpful in identifying the often hyperbolic bullying language.
• diminishers (e.g. “slightly”, “relatively”): diminishers, intensifiers and negation words were
all obtained from an English grammar describing these lexical classes and existing senti-
ment lexicons (see further).
• intensifiers (e.g. “absolutely”, “amazingly”)
• negation words
• aggressive language and profanity words: for English, we used the Google Profanity list
(https://code.google.com/archive/p/badwordslist/downloads). For Dutch, a public profan-
ity lexicon was consulted (http://scheldwoorden.goedbegin.nl).
Person alternation is a binary feature indicating whether the combination of a first and
second person pronoun occurs in order to capture interpersonal intent.
• Subjectivity lexicon features: positive and negative opinion word ratios, as well as the over-
all post polarity were calculated using existing sentiment lexicons. For Dutch, we made use
of the Duoman [71] and Pattern [72] lexicons. For English, we included the Liu and Hu
opinion lexicon [73], the MPQA lexicon [74], the General Inquirer Sentiment Lexicon [75],
Automatic detection of cyberbullying in social media text
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AFINN [76], and MSOL [77]. For both languages, we included the relative frequency of all
68 psychometric categories in the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) dictionary
for English [78] and Dutch [79].
• Topic model features: by making use of the Gensim topic modelling library [80], several
LDA [81] and LSI [82] topic models with varying granularity (k = 20, 50, 100 and 200) were
trained on data corresponding to each fine-grained category of a cyberbullying event (e.g.
threats, defamations, insults, defenses). The topic models were based on a background cor-
pus (EN: ± 1,200,000 tokens, NL: ± 1,400,000 tokens) scraped with the BootCaT [83] web-
corpus toolkit. BootCaT collected ASKfm user profiles using lists of manually determined
seed words that are characteristic of the cyberbullying categories.
When applied to the training data, this resulted in 871,296 and 795,072 features for English
and Dutch, respectively.
Results
In this section, we present the results of our experiments to automatically detect cyberbullying
signals in an English and Dutch corpus of ASKfm posts. Ten-fold cross-validation was per-
formed in exhaustive grid search over different feature type and hyperparameter combinations
(see the Experimental setup section). The unoptimised word n-gram-based classifier and key-
word-matching system serve as baselines for comparison. Precision, Recall and F1 performance
metrics were calculated on the positive class. We also report Area Under the Receiver Operator
Curve (AUROC) scores, a performance metric that is more robust to data imbalance than pre-
cision, recall and F score [84].
Table 5 gives us an indication of which feature type combinations score best and hence con-
tribute most to this task. It presents the cross-validation and hold-out scores of a set of feature
Table 5. Cross-validated and hold-out scores (%) according to different metrics (F1, precision, recall, accuracy and area under the curve) for the English and Dutch
three best and worst combined feature type systems.
Feature combination Cross-validation scores Hold-out scores
F1 P R Acc AUROC F1 P R Acc AUROC
English
Best three B + C + D + E 64.26 73.32 57.19 96.97 78.07 63.69 74.13 55.82 97.21 77.47
A + B + C 64.24 73.22 57.23 96.96 78.09 64.32 74.08 56.83 97.24 77.96
A + C + E 63.84 73.21 56.59 96.94 77.78 62.94 72.82 55.42 97.14 77.24
Worst three D 40.48 38.98 42.12 94.10 69.41 39.56 39.56 39.56 94.71 68.39
A + D + E 38.95 31.47 51.10 92.37 72.76 40.71 33.87 51.00 93.49 73.22
E 17.35 9.73 79.91 63.72 71.41 15.70 8.72 78.51 63.07 70.44
Baseline word n-gram 58.17 67.55 51.07 96.54 74.93 59.63 69.57 52.17 96.57 75.50
profanity 17.17 9.61 80.14 63.73 71.53 17.61 9.90 78.51 63.79 71.34
Dutch
Best three A + B + C + E 61.20 56.76 66.40 94.47 81.42 58.13 54.03 62.90 94.58 79.75
A + B + C + D + E 61.03 71.55 53.20 95.53 75.86 58.72 67.40 52.03 95.62 75.21
A + C + E 60.82 71.66 52.84 95.53 75.68 58.15 67.71 50.96 95.61 74.71
Worst three D + B 32.90 29.23 37.63 89.91 65.61 30.16 34.72 26.65 92.61 61.73
D 28.65 19.36 55.10 81.97 69.48 25.13 16.73 50.53 81.99 67.26
B 24.74 21.24 29.61 88.16 60.94 17.99 23.15 14.71 91.98 55.80
Baseline word n-gram 50.39 67.80 40.09 94.81 69.38 49.54 64.29 40.30 95.09 69.44
profanity 28.46 19.24 54.66 81.99 69.28 25.13 16.73 50.53 81.99 67.26
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203794.t005
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combinations, which are explained in the feature groups legend (Table 6). A total of 31 feature
type combinations, each with 28 different hyperparameter sets have been tested. Table 5 shows
the results for the three best scoring systems by included feature types with optimised hyper-
parameters. The maximum obtained F1 score in cross-validation is 64.26% for English and
61.20% for Dutch and shows that the classifier benefits from a variety of feature types. The
results on the hold-out test set show that the trained systems generalise well on unseen data,
indicating little under- or overfitting. The simple keyword-matching baseline system has the
lowest performance for both languages even though it obtains high recall for both languages,
especially for English (80.14%), suggesting that profane language characterises many cyberbul-
lying-related posts. Feature group and hyperparameter optimisation provides a considerable
performance increase over the unoptimised word n-gram baseline system. The top-scoring
systems for each language do not differ a lot in performance, except the best system for Dutch,
which trades recall for precision when compared to the runner-ups.
Table 7 presents the scores of the (hyperparameter-optimised) single feature type systems,
to gain insight into the performance of these feature types when used individually. Analysis of
the combined and single feature type sets reveals that word n-grams, character n-grams, and
subjectivity lexicons prove to be strong features for this task. In effect, adding character n-
grams always improved classification performance for both languages. They are likely to pro-
vide robustness to lexical variation in social media text, as compared to word n-grams. While
subjectivity lexicons appear to be discriminative features, term lists perform badly on their
own as well as in combinations for both languages. This shows once again (see the profanity
baseline) that cyberbullying detection requires more sophisticated information sources than
profanity lists. Topic models seem to do badly for both languages on their own, but in







Table 7. Cross-validated and hold-out scores (%) according to different metrics (F1, precision, recall, accuracy and area under the ROC curve) for English and
Dutch single feature type systems.
Feature type Cross-validation scores hold-out scores
F1 P R Acc AUROC F1 P R Acc AUROC
English
word n-grams 60.09 60.49 59.69 96.22 78.87 58.35 57.12 59.64 96.27 78.79
subjectivity lexicons 56.82 73.32 46.38 96.64 72.77 56.16 72.61 45.78 96.87 72.50
character n-grams 52.69 58.70 47.80 95.91 73.06 53.33 62.37 46.59 96.43 72.65
term lists 40.48 38.98 42.12 94.10 69.41 39.56 39.56 39.56 94.71 68.39
topic models 17.35 9.73 79.91 63.72 71.41 15.70 8.72 78.51 63.07 70.44
Dutch
word n-grams 55.53 72.64 44.94 95.27 71.88 54.99 70.20 45.20 95.57 71.99
subjectivity lexicons 54.34 54.12 54.56 93.97 75.65 51.82 50.61 53.09 94.09 74.90
character n-grams 51.70 67.58 41.86 94.86 70.22 50.46 65.20 41.15 95.17 69.88
term lists 28.65 19.36 55.10 81.97 69.48 25.13 16.73 50.53 81.99 67.26
topic models 24.74 21.24 29.61 88.16 60.94 17.99 23.15 14.71 91.98 55.80
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203794.t007
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combination with other features, they improve Dutch performance consistently. A possible
explanation for their varying performance in both languages would be that the topic models
trained on the Dutch background corpus are of better quality than the English ones. In effect,
a random selection of background corpus texts reveals that the English scrape contains more
noisy data (i.e. low word-count posts and non-English posts) compared to the Dutch scraped
corpus.
A shallow qualitative analysis of the classification output provided insight into some of the
classification mistakes.
Table 8 gives an overview of the error rates per cyberbullying category of the best perform-
ing and baseline systems. This could give an indication of the types of bullying are hard to
detect by the current classifier. All categories are always considered positive for cyberbullying
(i.e. the error rate equals the false negative rate), except for Sexual and Insult which can also be
negative (in case of harmless sexual talk and ‘socially acceptable’ insulting language like “hi
bitches, in for a movie?” the corresponding category was indicated, but the post itself was not
annotated as cyberbullying) and Not cyberbullying, which is always negative. Error rates often
being lowest for the profanity baseline confirms that it performs particularly well in terms of
recall (at the expense of precision, see Table 5). When looking at the best system for both lan-
guages, we see that Defense is the hardest category to classify. This should not be a surprise as
the category comprises defensive posts from bystanders and victims, which contain less aggres-
sive language than cyberbullying attacks and are often shorter in length than the latter. Asser-
tive defensive posts (i.e. a subcategory of Defense) which attack the bully are, however, more
often correctly classified. There are not sufficient instances of the Encouragement class for
either language in the hold-out set to be representative. In both languages, threats, curses and
incidences of sexual harassment are most easily recognisable, showing (far) lower error rates
than the categories Defamation, Defense, Encouragements to the harasser, and Insult.
A qualitative error analysis of the English and Dutch predictions reveals that false positives
often contain aggressive language directed at a second person, often denoting personal flaws
Table 8. Error rates (%) per cyberbullying subcategory on hold-out for English and Dutch systems.
Category Nr. occurrences in hold-out Profanity baseline Word n-gram baseline Best system
English
Curse n = 109 14.68 30.28 24.77
Defamation n = 21 23.81 47.62 38.10
Defense n = 165 22.42 52.12 43.64
Encouragement n = 1 0.00 100.00 100.00
Insult n = 345 26.67 41.74 35.94
Sexual n = 165 63.80 21.47 21,47
Threat n = 12 8.33 41.67 25.00
Not cyberbullying n = 10,714 36.94 1.10 0.76
Dutch
Curse n = 96 39.58 50.00 22.92
Defamation n = 6 100.00 66.67 33.33
Defense n = 200 52.50 63.50 46.00
Encouragement n = 5 40.00 60.00 40.00
Insult n = 355 43.38 47.89 28.17
Sexual n = 37 37.84 21.62 27.03
Threat n = 15 33.33 46.67 20.00
Not cyberbullying n = 7,295 15.63 1.23 3.07
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203794.t008
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or containing sexual and profanity words. We see that misclassifications are often short posts
containing just a few words and that false negatives often lack explicit verbal signs of cyberbul-
lying (e.g. insulting or profane words) or are ironic (examples 2 and 3). Additionally, we see
that cyberbullying posts containing misspellings or grammatical errors and incomplete words
are also hard to recognise as such (examples 4 and 5). The Dutch and English corpus are over-
all similar with respect to qualitative properties of classification errors.
2. You might want to do some sports ahah x
3. Look who is there… my thousandth anonymous hater, congratulations!
4. ivegot 1 word foryou… yknow whatit is? ! slut
5. One word for you: G—A—…
In short, the experiments show that our classifier clearly outperforms both a keyword-
based and word n-gram baseline. However, analysis of the classifier output reveals that false
negatives often lack explicit clues that cyberbullying is going on, indicating that our system
might benefit from irony recognition and integrating world knowledge to capture such
implicit realisations of cyberbullying.
Our annotation scheme allowed to indicate different author roles, which provides better
insight into the realisation of cyberbullying. Table 9 presents the error rates of our classifier for
the different author roles, being harasser, victim, and two types of bystanders. We observe that
the error rates are high for bystander assistant and victim, but there are not sufficient instances
in the hold-out set of the former role for either language to be representative. Error rates for
the victim class of 50.39% and 54% in English and Dutch respectively indicate that the role is
hard to recognise by the classifier. A possible explanation for this could be that victim posts
in our corpus either expressed powerlessness facing the bully (example 6) or either contained
explicit aggressive language as well (example 7).
6. Your the one going round saying im a cunt and a twat and im ugly. tbh all im doing is stick-
ing up for myself.
7. You’re fucked up saying I smell from sweat, because unlike some other people I shower every
day BITCH
According to the figures, the most straightforward roles in detection are bystander defender
and harasser.
Table 9. Error rates (%) per cyberbullying participant role on hold-out for English and Dutch systems.
Participant role Nr. occurrences in hold-out Profanity baseline Word n-gram baseline Best system
English
Harasser n = 328 20.43 48.48 43.60
Bystander assistant n = 2 50.00 100.00 100.00
Bystander defender n = 39 7.69 38.46 25.64
Victim n = 129 27.91 57.36 50.39
Not cyberbullying n = 10872 37.64 1.24 0.89
Dutch
Harasser n = 261 47.13 56.70 29.89
Bystander assistant n = 6 50.00 66.67 50.00
Bystander defender n = 52 25.00 38.46 23.08
Victim n = 150 62.00 72.00 54.00
Not cyberbullying n = 7370 16.01 1.42 3.41
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203794.t009
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In the light of comparison with state-of-the-art approaches to cyberbullying, we observe
that competitive results are obtained with regard to [30–32, 41]. However, the fundamental
differences with respect to data collection, sources, and conceptualisations of bullying hardly
allow for direct comparison. Table 10 presents the experimental results obtained by [43–45]
who, like the current study, approach the task as detecting posts from bullies as well as from
victims and bystanders. Given their experimental setup (i.e. task description, data genre and
classifier), their work can be considered most similar to ours so their results might function
as benchmarks. Also here, a number of crucial differences with the current approach can be
observed: Firstly, their corpora were collected using the keywords “bully”, “bullying” and “bul-
lied”, which may bias the dataset towards the positive class and ensures that many explicit lexi-
calisations are present in the positive class. Second, it is not clear which types of cyberbullying
(i.e. explicit and implicit bullying, threats, insults, sexual harassment) are included in the posi-
tive class. Furthermore, as can be deduced from Table 10, the datasets are considerably smaller
than ours and show a more balanced class distribution (respectively 39% cyberbullying posts
in [43] and [44], and 29%/26% in [45]) than the ratio of bullying posts in our corpus (see
Table 3: 5% for English, 7% for Dutch). Hence, any comparison should be made with caution
due to these differences.
These studies obtain higher scores on similar task but vastly different datasets. Notably,
[45] shows a great improvement in classification performance using deep representational
learning with a semantic-enhanced marginalized denoising auto-encoder over traditional n-
gram and topic modelling features.
Conclusions and future research
The goal of the current research was to investigate the automatic detection of cyberbullying-
related posts on social media. Given the information overload on the web, manual monitoring
for cyberbullying has become unfeasible. Automatic detection of signals of cyberbullying
would enhance moderation and allow to respond quickly when necessary.
Cyberbullying research has often focused on detecting cyberbullying ‘attacks’ and hence
overlook other or more implicit forms of cyberbullying and posts written by victims and
bystanders. However, these posts could just as well indicate that cyberbullying is going on. The
main contribution of this paper is that it presents a system to automatically detect signals of
cyberbullying on social media, including different types of cyberbullying, covering posts from
bullies, victims and bystanders. We evaluated our system on a manually annotated cyberbully-
ing corpus for English and Dutch and hereby demonstrated that our approach can easily be
applied to different languages, provided that annotated data for these languages are available.
A set of binary classification experiments were conducted to explore the feasibility of auto-
matic cyberbullying detection on social media. In addition, we sought to determine which
information sources contribute most to the task. Two classifiers were trained on an English
and Dutch ASKfm corpus and evaluated on a hold-out test of the same genre. Our experiments
reveal that the current approach is a promising strategy for detecting signals of cyberbullying
Table 10. Overview of the most related cyberbullying detection approaches.
Reference Classifier Corpus Bully rate F1 score
[44] SVM 1,762 tweets 39% 77%
[43] wvec+SVM 1,762 tweets 39% 78%
[45] smSDA+SVM 7,321 tweets 29% 72%
[45] smSDA+SVM 1,539 MySpace posts 26% 78%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203794.t010
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on social media automatically. After feature and hyperparameter optimisation of our models, a
maximum F1 score of 64.32% and 58.72% was obtained for English and Dutch, respectively.
The classifiers hereby significantly outperformed a keyword and an (unoptimised) n-gram
baseline. A qualitative analysis of the results revealed that false positives often include implicit
cyberbullying or offenses through irony, the challenge of which will constitute an important
area for future work. Error rates on the different author roles in our corpus revealed that espe-
cially victims are hard to recognise, as they react differently in our corpus, showing either pow-
erlessness facing the bully or reacting in an assertive and sometimes even aggressive way.
As shown in [45] deep representation learning is a promising avenue for this task. We
therefore intent to apply deep learning techniques to improve classifier performance.
Another interesting direction for future work would be the detection of fine-grained cyber-
bullying categories such as threats, curses and expressions of racism and hate. When applied in
a cascaded model, the system could find severe cases of cyberbullying with high precision. This
would be particularly interesting for monitoring purposes. Additionally, our dataset allows for
detection of participant roles typically involved in cyberbullying. When applied as moderation
support on online platforms, such a system enables feedback in function of the recipient (i.e. a
bully, victim, or bystander).
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